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social zation effects on
democratiz; tion*

Ellen S. Cohn and Susan 0. White
Much has happened in the few short years since power controlled by something called the rule
the 1989 revolutions that freed the Central and of law.
The rule of law ideal was voiced not only
Eastern Europe countries from Soviet domination and started them towards democratiz- in the streets but also in the new halls of power.
ation. The promise of these upheavals was By many accounts it continues to be a working
almost as great as our surprise that they hap- ideal even for those who are struggling with
pened at all. It is safe to say that observers the hard political realities produced by new
around the world, as well as the participants experiences with economic uncertainties and the
themselves, have been watching developments conflicts inherent in democratic politics (see, for
since 1989 with a mixture of fascination and example, Markovits, 1995). The prominence of
this concept in the process
doubt, curious to see if
of democratization that curstable democratic processes
Ellen S. Cohn is Professor of Psychology,
rently characterizes political
can take root where
and Susan 0. White is Professor of Politactivity in the former Soviet
repression reigned for so
ical Science, at the University of New
Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824, USA.
satellites gives rise to a
long. The fact that the conThey have collaborated on several publinumber of questions. Who
ditions for change are
cations that focus on legal socialization
holds this ideal and what
extreme, both politically
and the development of legal culture,
does it mean to them? Is it
and economically, makes
including k g a l Socialization: A Study
held only by the new elites
the unfolding spectacle
of Norms and Rules (1990), and
‘The Relationship Between Legal
in their activist political
particularly powerful.
Reasoning and Behavioural Context’,
rhetoric? Or is the rule of
‘The rule of law’ is a
Droit et Sociize‘ (1992).
law concept widely distribvenerable
concept
in
uted in the political beliefs
theories of liberal demoand aspirations of ordinary
cracy,
but
Western
citizens? What place does it
observers were somewhat
have in the development of
startled to hear it as a rallying cry for these revolutionary movements. It democratic institutions? To what extent is the
was particularly striking that those who took concept ‘rule of law’ related to concepts about
to the revolutionary streets day after day rights and duties, political freedom, and a conseemed to be pursuing an ideal of freedom and stitutional foundation for state authority?
As the struggle between brutal past and
democratic participation that did not fit any
existing polity. The focus on the rule of law difficult present is played out, one important
and constitutionalism in the rhetoric of revol- focus for research is the strength of those culution seemed to demonstrate that people who tural norms that would support or undermine the
have been repressed by arbitrary power for democratization process. In particular, is there
many years still have the capacity to believe support for the rule of law and for legal values
that power can be limited and the abuse of such as individual rights, fairness, equality and
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political freedom? How necessary are supportive cultural norms to the transitional process of
democratization? Indeed, how necessary are
they for the maintenance of a stable democracy?
The data to be presented in this article cannot
provide answers to the whole range of such
questions. But perhaps they can contribute to
a better understanding of the transition from
repressive regime to more democratic institutions, i.e., a better understanding of the processes that we refer to as democratization.
Political theorists have long argued that the
factors that comprise civil society are necessary
ingredients in a stable democracy. There is considerable debate, however, over what these
necessary factors are, where they come from,
and how they interact with other variables over
time. For example, it has been variously argued
that adherence to specific values, childhood socialization, experiences with relevant institutions,
and level of interpersonal trust are critical to
the maintenance of stable democracy. There is
also debate over whether civil society variables
are causes or effects of democratization. That
these debates are unresolved speaks to an as
yet inadequate empirical conceptualization of
democracy, one which renders speculative our
attempts to identify critical aspects of societies
which are moving from repressive regimes
towards democracy.
We will not argue that the variations in
political and legal culture variables that we
present in this article can predict the course of
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe,
or, in and of themselves, explain differences in
the legal systems currently developing there.
Instead, our purpose is primarily descriptive: to
map the existing legal cultures in these areas
and place them into a broader context of democratization by comparing them to older European democracies. Since our data are crosssectional, from 1995 surveys, and not longitudinal, they cannot provide contemporaneous information about the effects of socializing experiences. Nonetheless, we will also present some
analyses that indicate how socialization processes interact with stages along a continuum
from repression to democratization.
Specifically, the purpose of this article is
to compare legal cultures, focusing especially
on support for the rule of law, in the following
ways. First, we present a macro-level cross-
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national comparison of attitudinal data from six
democracies: Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Spain,
France and the United States. Arrayed on a
continuum from new to old democracy, these
six countries approximate to a rough scale of
democratization. The populations of three new
democracies have until recently lived (to
slightly varying degrees) under repressive and
corrupt legal regimes for fifty years or more,
while the populations of three older democracies
have experienced legal regimes that, for varying
lengths of time, have offered approximations to
the rule of law. Second, we present a microlevel comparison of attitudinal differences
across groups within these populations representing different generations and age cohorts,
and elite versus mass socialization.

Legal socialization and legal
culture
Theoretical bases
Legal socialization refers to the processes
through which members of a society acquire its
legal values, such as fairness, equality, and justice, and its norms of rule-governed behaviour.
The primary socializers of legal values may be
families, schools, peers, religious groups, or the
state itself, depending on the relative influence
of these agents in the culture and the extent to
which a society is traditional in its orientation
to authority. In heavily policed societies such
as Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary during Soviet
domination one might expect legal values to
conform fairly rigidly to ideological definitions.
Likewise, in societies where social control is
less a function of the state one might expect
more variation in legal values.
There is considerable debate in the literature about how and when socialization to legal
and political values takes place (Cohn and
White, 1990; Renshon, 1977; Sigal, 1989; Tyler,
1990, 1994). Experiences in childhood have
attracted extensive attention, but a number of
social scientists from several disciplines have
focused primarily on the adolescent/youth
‘stage’ (variously defined) as a uniquely
important formative period for the development
of social and political beliefs and values (see,
for example, Adelson and O’Neil, 1966; Delli
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issues are fought over this well-defined territory.
Our focus on the role of law in democratization
inevitably forces the conceptual framework to
widen because of the diverse cultures and political histories it must now encompass. It may
also suggest that the predominantly AngloAmerican/Western model of law under liberal
democracy may be too narrow or restrictive to
be adapted easily to less individualistic, more
authoritarian, and more ethnically divided cultural traditions. If so, our analysis will have
implications both for the rigidity of Western
liberal legality and for the potential effectiveness of the rule of law ideal in non-Western
countries.
We present measures of legal values that
comprise three components of a liberal law
ideology: law consciousness, rights consciousness, and a calculus of fairness. ‘Law consciousness’ refers to the importance people
attach to the moral authority of law and their
understanding of legal obligation. ‘Rights consciousness’ is a measure of how highly people
value the claims that can be made and protected
under the law. The ‘calculus of fairness’
encompasses the valuation of both procedural
and distributive justice, and their relative importance, to the respondent. It must also take
account of the weight to be given to communitarian concerns, represented by the social fairness scale.
The first law consciousness variable is a
scale measuring support for obedience to law,
or lawfulness, including questions about the
conditions under which governments and citizens should obey or break a law. A second,
justifiable behaviours, allows us to compare the
Legal values
conceptual assessments of lawfulness with specific instances of law-breaking. In the strict
The characteristics of law under liberal demo- sense of the term, ‘the rule of law’ is a function
cracy are well known, although not always of legality. The standard of legality requires
accepted across the ideological spectrum that that a legal system be composed of a set of
supports democracy as a political ideal. The formal procedures which, in turn, produces forthree most general characteristics are the pri- mal rules. The purpose of the insistence on
macy of law over arbitrary uses of political formal procedures and rules is to protect parties
power, the primacy of the individual through before the law from arbitrary decisions. In
the protection of individual rights claims, and theory, at least, formal procedures constrain the
the primacy of universalism over particularism decision-maker from responding to the extrathrough the abstraction of the individual ‘before legal characteristics of either the parties or the
the law’ from social characteristics. None of substance under dispute, and formal rules narthese values is absolute, but even contemporary rowly define the bases for decision. In addition,
‘culture wars’ over communitarian and remedial a felt obligation to obey the law (Tyler, 1990)
Carpini, 1989; Jennings and Niemi, 1981;
Mannheim, 1952). It is at this stage that cognitive development reaches a critical period of
disequilibrium, rendering the individual more
open to new ideas and to the role-taking opportunities that become the basis for moral reciprocity and a sense of fairness (Cohn and White,
1990; Kohlberg, 1969; Tapp and Levine, 1974).
In addition, there is now a growing body of
studies focusing on adult development and
social learning (Sigel, 1989). Since a developmental approach to adult learning rests more
on changing opportunities and responsibilities
through the lifecycle than on the effects of the
psycho-physical maturation, this literature
argues that sociaUpolitica1 learning (or perhaps
relearning) is a continuous process rather than
one that is concentrated in biologically-defined,
and peculiarly fertile, stages of development.
For the purposes of this article, we will
focus on the effects of political experiences,
both in adolescence and throughout the lifecycle, as sources of legal values. Our context
is democratization, and we compare populations
from countries that have at least a twenty-year
history of democracy with populations from
countries that have just emerged from more than
fifty years of political repression. Our data will
allow us to ask to what extent the latter populations now hold the same legal values as the
former. We can also ask whether current adolescents and those who were adolescents during
particularly dramatic episodes of repression and
resistance differ from others in these populations in their adherence to the rule of law
ideal and other legal values.
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is often premised on a perception that these ing state power and for open competition in
formal rules are just, both in their design and contests for power are severely limited or nonin their fair enforcement. A perception that rules existent. It was the growing capacity of people
in fact constrain those who enforce them is a to exercise political freedom - especially in the
key condition of their legitimacy for those who expression of resistance through massive street
obey these rules. It is in this way that law gains demonstrations that were not effectively chalmoral authority. Together, therefore, formal pro- lenged by the governments in question - that
cedures and rules limit discretion both in signalled to the world the weakening and
decision-making and in obedience to rules.
approaching demise of authoritarian state conThe questions in our lawfulness and justi- trol and the reality and strength of the 1989
fiable behaviours scales are designed to elicit a revolutionary movements. Social rights also
respondent’s propensity to approve departures have a special place in the particular instance
from a strict adherence to law (Gibson and of democratization that we are analysing. The
Caldeira, 1996). Such departures can stem from new constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe
several sources. A respondent may perceive the seek to institutionalize the social guarantees of
law or its enforcement as lacking moral auth- the old social order, including rights to a clean
ority to some degree. Some respondents may environment, to education, to a job, and to leisadhere strictly to law out of personal rigidity. ure (Eastern Constitutional Review; see also
Also, unstable social and political conditions Markovits, 1995). In Western Europe, the social
can put a strain on people’s willingness to trust democratic tradition has often dominated polithe rule of law. In addition to their perceptions tics, with the consequence that claims to social
of the moral authority of the law, therefore, rights are common although not always instiissues of security may also affect respondents’ tutionalized. In the United States, the legalizpropensity to approve departures from a strict ation of such rights by giving them constiadherence to law. The possible effects of these tutional status is uncommon and perhaps
three factors can be inferred from other analyses unpopular. Social and economic change.
of these data, as we discuss below. Use of the especially the appearance of the ‘new poor’ in
two scales allows us to differentiate between a the countries of Eastern and Central Europe,
conceptual analysis of reasons for obeying or may make social rights a particularly volatile
violating the law, and justifications for specific factor in rights consciousness across these populations (White, Batt and Lewis, 1993). We
instances of law-breaking.
Rights consciousness is an ‘awareness’ and argue, however, that legalizing social rights
a ‘set of expectations about how citizens ought claims runs counter to the fundamental individuto be treated by major social and political insti- alism of liberal legality - not to the social goals
tutions’ (Gibson and Duch, 1993, p. 242). It is and egalitarian leanings of liberal democracy
measured by a series of nine questions (see per se, but to the sense in which the individual
appendix) asking respondents to indicate the rather than the group is the focus of legalized
importance to them of a range of rights claims, (and especially constitutionalized) rights claims.
This latter issue arises clearly in the second
using the reference term ‘right’ in five questions, ‘freedom’ in three questions, and ‘equal- rights-oriented variable that we report: i.e.,
ity’ in one question. The rights claims range rights for what we have called excluded groups.
from freedom to express political views to a In separate questions (see appendix), responright to abortion. The rights consciousness scale dents were asked whether their country should
is noteworthy in this comparative context guarantee a job to ‘foreigners’, ‘gypsies’
(Gibson and Duch, 1993) because it includes (‘minorities’ in the US), and women. In addition
not only strictly political rights (e.g., to express to its implications for exclusionary politics, this
political views) but also social rights (e.g., to variable tests the extent to which rights cona job and a clean environment). Political rights sciousness, when applied to specific claims, is
such as freedom of speech are important legal oriented more to individual or to group claims.
values because law is presumed to control state In liberal democracy, legal theory abstracts the
power by protecting political freedom. Without individual from social characteristics. Since parpolitical freedom, the possibilities for challeng- ties before the law are envisioned as moral
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beings bearing the rights of citizenship, it is not ing political freedom for social order. We
only cases that must be treated alike but the expect respondents to vary along a liberty-toparties that bring them as well. This legal like- order continuum depending on their experiences
ness is not a principle of social equality but, with political instability, and perhaps on the
rather, of neutrality and impartiality across par- kind and length of their familiarity with politities, who appear before the law as unequals in cal openness.
The calculus of fairness is a third approach
many respects but are nonetheless treated as
equals before the law. In effect, the law ignores to liberal legality involving the specific judgthe social sources of inequality (e.g., wealth, ments that individuals make when they decide
gender, class, race) and instead treats parties as issues of justice. These justice judgments (Lind
abstract individuals: i.e., as individuals without and Tyler, 1988) have often been understood
the social markings of inequality. This legal within a framework defined by a dichotomy
abstraction of the individual from social charac- between distributive and procedural factors. Disteristics is given a political context when rights tributive factors can include a range of social
for excluded groups are considered. We expect justice issues, or simply the outcomes of various
that the implied universalism in viewing the political decision-making processes, including
individual as an abstract entity may be alien to legal decisions.
Our first justice judgment variable repsome of the political contexts of our study,
especially in identity-based politics such as resents the importance the respondents place on
the ethnic particularism of Eastern and Cen- procedural justice (Thibault and Walker, 1975),
tral Europe.
measured by four questions concerning how one
Our third rights-oriented variable tests the is treated by governmental authority (see
strength of a commitment to political rights in appendix). While legality (in the sense of formal
the abstract by asking respondents about specific rules and procedures) is not itself a moral prinsituations where political freedom must be ciple, there is a kind of ethic inherent in the
weighed against the threat of disorder. Four concept, one component of which is the due
questions (see appendix) form a scale of ‘liberty process of law. The strict meaning of due proversus order’ that forces the respondents to cess is simply the process that is due a party
choose between individual liberty and social under the law, but that meaning has been elevorder. This scale highlights the different ways ated in Anglo-American law to imply a standard
in which the power of law can be concep- of fairness in legal proceedings. In this elevated
tualized. On the one hand, law can provide sense, due process refers to the treatment that
security against disruption and instability. On is due to a moral being bearing the rights of
the other hand, the rule of law can act as a (normally) citizenship. Thus procedural fairness
barrier against arbitrary, personalistic, and implies both a standard of treatment and a moral
repressive behaviour by those in power. The claim to that treatment by the partykitizen.
positive force of law arises from its capacity
Lind and Tyler (1988) have taken this conto facilitate democratic processes by protecting cept into the realm of social and political behavindividual rights, the free expression of opi- iour by finding differences in responses to pronions, and an open flow of information. Its cedural versus distributive justice, and
negative force protects against the potential for particularly in the relative strength of procedural
anarchy in the face of social disintegration and justice in respondents’ evaluations of their
an excessive push for freedom. Together, these experiences with the law. This research has
polar aspects of the rule of law reflect the cen- shown, for example, that fair procedures bolster
tral importance of the relationship between the the legitimacy of political and legal institutions
individual and government in any conceptualiz- (Tyler, 1988, 1994). The power of this variable
ation of law. In forcing respondents to choose has been amply demonstrated (Lind and Tyler,
between individual liberty and social order, 1988; Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994; Tyler, 1988,
these questions allow us to see how respondents 1994), but most applications have been in the
modify (if they do) their commitment to rights context of American experiences with law. In
in the abstract when faced with specific political the same set of questions about encounters with
contexts that suggest strong reasons for sacrific- governmental authority that assesses the impor0 UNESCO 1997.
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tance of procedural justice, we introduced a
measure of distributive justice by asking respondents an additional question about the importance of the outcome. We also report a measure
of the relative importance of procedural and
distributive justice (computed by a difference
score). In addition, we report country means on
a scale of fairness defined in communitarian
terms, in which higher scores indicate a sensitivity to the effects of a law on ‘most people’.
A comparison of the relative importance of procedural justice with the fairness score provides
what we call a calculus of fairness for each
respondent in which procedural and distributive
justice judgments, which focus on the individual, are weighed against a more social or communitarian sense of fairness. We expect to see
a further demonstration of the importance of
procedural fairness in the European context,
particularly among those who have recently
experienced repressive regimes. We also expect
to see greater support for social fairness in
the East.

Ellen S. Cohn and Susan 0.White

individual to communitarian values and a preference for traditional ways of life in which the
authority of family and religion is primary.
Another fundamental dimension in a person’s belief system is reflected in our social
conservatism scale, which measures the tendency to accept or reject social change. Acceptance of social change has often been viewed as
a characteristic of the modernizing society,
while resistance is assumed to signal an antimodernist stance towards a changing world.
Without getting into the considerable complexities of the debate over the requisites of
modernization, we can relate this simple distinction to attitudes towards law. All the legal
values we have measured fit the model of law
that is inherent in liberal democracy, which in
turn tends to elevate individual rights claims as
against the social status quo. Particularly in the
more political dimension of legality, people who
support these legal values are less likely to
agree to ‘adapt to the rules of society rather
than fighting them’ or ‘accept the flaws of existing authority’ or ‘accept the way society works’
Sources of legal values
than are those who do not support these values.
As a means of determining the extent to which The latter are more socially conservative than
these legal values are anchored in the belief the former and their social conservatism leads
systems of the populations we surveyed, we them to resist change, perhaps especially the
also measured certain fundamental aspects of kind of change brought about through an instruthe respondents’ orientation to the political and mental use of law to protect individual rights
social worlds in which they live. These meas- claims.
ures are reported as three variables (see
A third dimension of support for liberal
appendix). The first of these variables indicates legal values may be a reflection of personality
whether a respondent is more inclined towards characteristics that indicate a more or less rigid
individualism or collectivism, a conceptual con- approach to one’s social and political world.
tinuum originally introduced by cultural psy- This kind of rigidity has been studied by many
chologists (Triandis, 1990) and often used, in social psychologists but the most frequently
various versions, by many social scientists (see, adopted measure is the dogmatism scale
for example, Bierbrauer, 1994; Gibson and Cal- developed by Rokeach (1960). We have used
deira, 1996). Using eight items devised for this four items from Rokeach’s dogmatism scale
study (see appendix) that force a choice (see appendix) to determine whether this kind
between group values such as family, society of propensity towards personal rigidity with
or nation, and individualistic values, respon- respect to social and political life identifies
dents are located on a continuum anchored by those who are less likely to be open to other
individualism at one end and collectivism at the points of view and who are therefore less supother. In the context of legal values, preference portive of the freedoms protected as political
for individual claims over the interests of the and social rights by the law. This kind of meascommunity fits conceptually with the abstraction ure, while closely related conceptually to both
of the individual from social characteristics and low support of individualism and social conthe universalism inherent in the legal concepts servatism, reflects in particular a personality that
of liberal democracy. Collectivism, on the other is inclined to react to any issue in black versus
hand, suggests both the subordination of the white, either/or terms.
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While we do not here attempt a causal
analysis, we would argue that these three measures can be understood conceptually as sources
of legal values. Each of these scales tells us
something about the extent to which a respondent holds fundamental attitudes towards political and social life that would incline a person
towards or against acceptance of legal values.
The values we have chosen to measure are
premised on liberal democratic principles such
as universalism in the application of law,
respect for citizen rights, equality before the
law, and the limitation of authority. Acceptance
of such values depends in part on a person’s
capacity for independence, even-handedness and
openness to change. Our argument is that one’s
orientation to the social order - that is, to norms
of authority and obedience, and to issues that
pit the welfare of the group against individual
autonomy and that emphasize individual versus
group responsibility - may also affect one’s
willingness to accept legal values that test
these orientations.

Legal values and socialization
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a repressive legal regime. We also hypothesize
that there will be differences between support
for values in the abstract and support for specific instances, and that the differential will be
greater in those populations now undergoing
transitional social and economic instability. Gibson and Duch (1993) found that rights consciousness is higher in newer than in older
democracies, suggesting that the newer democracies in our analysis may have a higher rights
consciousness than expected on the basis of the
socialization processes their populations experienced under repressive regimes.
We will also ask if it is possible to detect
micro-level legal culture differences within
populations that suggest differential effects on
the democratization process depending on how
one has been socialized to legal values. In this
analysis, we will pay particular attention to the
hypothesis discussed above which suggests that
those who experience critical events relating to
repression and resistance during their adolescence or early youth will develop a distinct
generational response. If such age cohorts can
be identified, does the effect persist long enough
to influence later attitudes and behaviours?
Because the adolescent hypothesis emphasizes
the state of disequilibrium in adolescence
(Kohlberg, 1969) which is particularly vulnerable to conditions of conflict and receptive to
role-taking opportunities (Cohn and White,
1990), we will look particularly at the possible
effects of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the
student revolts and ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968,
and the revolutionary upheavals of 1989.

How are these legal values related to socialization? Since we do not have longitudinal data
with which to test hypotheses about attitude
change through the process of transition from
dominance by a repressive regime towards the
establishment of democratic institutions, we
shall instead pay close attention to comparisons
between legal cultures that are at different
stages of democratization. Several basic questions will be uppermost throughout these analyses. Are there macro-level differences in legal Research design
values between countries that result in a scale
ordering of legal cultures that approximates to The analysis that is presented in this article is
our rough scale of democratization? Are there based upon national surveys conducted in Bulsignificant differences in support for legal garia ( n = 83 l), Poland ( n = 824), Hungary
values between populations that have recently ( n = 786), Spain ( n = 775), France ( n = 762),
experienced repressive legal and political and the United States ( n = 810). Face-to-face
regimes (i.e. Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary) and interviews were conducted in Bulgaria, Poland,
populations that are living under non-repressive Hungary, Spain and France in the spring of
regimes (Spain, France, United States)? If so, 1995 and telephone interviews were conducted
are these differences related to attitudes that we in the United States in the winter of 1995have identified as sources of legal values?
1996. In each country, random national samples
We expect to find such differences, and of participants aged eighteen or older were
hypothesize that they will be in the direction selected. As is usual in these surveys, slightly
of more support for liberal legal values in popu- more females than males participated (52.1% in
lations that do not have recent experience under Bulgaria, 59.4% in Poland, 53.9% in Hungary,
0 UNESCO 1997
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55.1% in Spain, 50.5% in France, and 50.6%
in the United States). The largest percentage
of respondents were Roman Catholic in Poland
(96.1%) and Spain (80.8%). Of the Hungarian
sample, 49.1% described themselves as Roman
Catholic, 24.7% as atheists and 11.5% as Protestants. In Bulgaria, the largest percentage of
respondents were Eastern Orthodox (5 I .4%);
32.5% described themselves as Muslim. In
France, the largest percentage of respondents
were Roman Catholic (69.9%), with 19.5%
describing themselves as atheists. In the United
States, the largest percentage of the respondents
were Protestant (50.2%). Technical documents
on the methodology are available from the
authors.

Legal cultures and
democratization
In this section, we provide a basic description
of the legal cultures of our six countries. The
data consist of mean responses, by country, to
the questions we have discussed above. As
Table 1 indicates, there are a number of strong
country differences. Whether they form interesting patterns is the first question for discussion
below.
As mentioned above, we have hypothesized
an ordering of the six countries along a rough
scale of democratization. Our criteria are drawn
less from democratic theory than from the historical fact base that describes the chronological
age of the six democratic regimes, which is
simply a measure of how much experience each
has had with democratic politics. Our point of
reference is Western democracy, or the model
of liberal democracy in the West, not because
of a normative preference so much as a practical
desire to adopt the model with the most currency and, therefore, about which we have the
most knowledge. On this basis, the oldest
democracy is, obviously, the United States, followed by France and Spain.
Since Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary each
began its formal ‘democratizing’ in the same
year, our criterion of experience with democratic politics becomes even less precise when
applied to them. However, if one looks at the
relative proximity of each of these countries to
Western democracies - through political, econ-
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omic and cultural contact - it seems clear that
Hungary has had the longest and closest contact
with the West, followed by Poland and then
Bulgaria (Held, 1992; Weil, 1993; White, Batt
and Lewis, 1993). The Hungarian Government
was, since 1968 or so, the most open to Western
economic involvement and the most pragmatic
politically; Poland was considerably more rigid
politically and less open to Western ideas; Bulgaria was remote from the West culturally as
well as politically and economically. Since the
scale of democratization that results from this
ordering is simply a heuristic for our purposes,
we have not been concerned with more precise
or detailed comparisons.
The first set of data is comprised of the
mean responses to the legal values variables.
These are law consciousness, including the lawfulness scale and the justifiable behaviours
scale; rights consciousness, including the rights
consciousness scale, rights for excluded groups,
and the liberty/order scale; and the calculus of
fairness, including the importance of procedural
justice scale, the distributive justice score, the
relative importance of procedural justice score,
and the social fairness scale. The first point to
note is that our heuristic scale of democratization fits some of the data. The relative importance of procedural justice and the importance
of distributive justice fit the scale fairly well,
as does the preference of liberty over order.
There is little variation at all across the six
countries for rights consciousness and the
importance of procedural justice, however. And
the data are rather curvilinear for rights for
excluded groups.
With respect to law consciousness, mean
scores on the lawfulness scale indicate that none
of these populations is strongly committed to
abiding by the law in all circumstances. In fact,
lawfulness barely rises above the midpoint of
the scale across all the countries. These questions are designed to force the respondent to
face difficult choices involved in law enforcement, and it is clear that many can find reasons
to avoid strict adherence to law. On the other
hand, mean scores on the four-point justifiable
behaviours scale indicate a higher level of lawfulness when the moral authority of law is
invoked. This more specific measure asks
whether it is morally justifiable to engage in
each of five different law-breaking behaviours.
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TABLE1. Means and standard deviations for legal values, social beliefs and democratization for six countries
Measures
N
Legal values
Lawfulness

Justifiable behaviours
Rights
Excluded groups
Liberty
Procedural justice
Distributive justice

Rel. proced. justice
Social fairness
Social beliefs
Individual.

Dogmatism
Social conservatism
Democratization
Perception of economy

Satis. with democracy

Bulgaria
828

Poland
817

3.36h
(0.91)
3.75"
(0.43)
4.12'
(0.54)
3.63'
(0.79)
2.37d
(0.77)
4.63'
(0.64)
4.60k
(0.87)
0.Olk
(0.76)
2.84"
(0.49)

3.24'
(0.86)
3.64hc
(0.43)
4.16'
(0.56)
3.39
(0.83)
2.61'
(0.78)
4.57'
(0.56)
4.65"
(0.78)

Countries
Hungary
Spain
778
772

France
762

USA
810

(0.73)
2.76k
(0.49)

3.13*
(0.66)
3.67h
(0.43)
4.10'
(0.54)
3.78b
(0.71)
2.66'
(0.88)
4.82"
(0.37)
4.91"
(0.39)
-0.lW
(0.40)
2.99"
(0.50)

3.33'
(0.65)
3.56'
(0.48)
4.47"
(0.49)
4.14"
(0.75)
3.38'"
(0.85)
4.72a"
(0.58)
4.66"
(0.75)
0.06"
(0.60)
2.8W
(0.47)

3.12"
(0.86)
3.13"
(0.61)
4.27h
(0.53)
3.77b
(0.97)
3.26"
(0.99)
4.55'
(0.58)
4.45"
(0.89)
0.09b
(0.83)
2.77k
(0.53)

3.69"
(0.58)
3.68ah
(0.45)
4.34b
(0.49)
3.41"
(0.96)
3.48"
(0.78)
4.64b
(0.76)
4.09d
(1.29)
0.55"
(1.23)
2.53d
(0.47)

2.04*
(0.74)
3.76"
(0.80)
2.8Ih
(0.93)

2.17'
(0.74)
3.51"
(0.75)
3.13"
(0.82)

2.47"
(0.74)
3.31"
(0.86)
2.80"
(0.86)

2.72"
(0.64)
2.84"
(0.77)
2.58'
(0.79)

2.39h
(0.68)
3.34'
(0.88)
2.92h
(0.95)

2.77"
(0.63)
2.84"
(0.81)
2.43"
(0.69)

2.72'
(0.60)
1.77'
(0.78)

2.69'
(0.62)
1 .9Yd
(0.74)

2.25"
(0.52)
1.88d
(0.77)

2.74"
(0.52)

2.85"
(0.5 1)
2.22"
(0.83)

2.82ah
(0.47)
2.58"
(0.83)

4.1w

2.12k

(0.86)

Note: The superscripts are ordered so that a is the highest mean and d is the lowest mean for each variable. Overall
there were significant multivariate effects of country on the legal values (F(40, 20393.72) = 353.58, p < 0.001,
Wilks lambda=O.IO), the social beliefs (F(15, 13104.78)= 83.81, p < 0.001, Wilks lambda=0.78) and the two
democratization variables (F(10, 9066) = 99.19, p < 0.001, Wilks lambda= 0.81). The superscripts above are based
on Scheffe post hoc tests conducted on the variables with significant univariate Fs.

It reveals that respondents in all the countries
distinguish between law violations depending
on their social or political context. The distribution of responses across the scale suggests
that respondents in each country are ambivalent
about paying taxes and taking government benefits illegally. On the other hand, there is a polarized consensus against the moral justifiability
of stealing and accepting bribes both within and
across the countries. We believe that interpretations of responses to more conceptual ques-
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tions about reasons for departing from strict
adherence to law, such as those in the lawfulness scale, can be enhanced in the light of
responses to questions about specific areas of
law-breaking as well.
It is clear that rights are highly valued in
all six countries. Although rights consciousness
is somewhat lower in the three countries that
have recently emerged from repressive rule,
there appears to be a strong consensus about
the importance of rights across populations that
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Gypsy candidate campaigning for senatorial elections in Romania, 1990. AtgerlEditing

have had notably different experiences with law.
It is clear that claiming rights is one aspect of
liberal democracy that finds fertile ground in
the newly ‘liberalized’ populations. We can see
some variation in commitment to rights if we
look at instances of claims to social rights in
which the claimant is specified, however. The
commitment decreases in all countries when
questions are asked about rights to a job for
excluded groups. Table 2 compares responses
to the item from the rights consciousness scale
that asks about ‘right to a job’ with the three
items from the excluded groups scale that ask
the same question specifying foreigners, women
or gypsies (minorities in the United States).
Commitment to the right to a job for excluded
groups clearly weakens in all countries, in some
cases precipitously, except when the recipient
is a woman. This finding indicates that rights
entitlement is devalued when the claimant is
perceived to be outside the normal group.

0 UNESCO 1097.

Returning our attention to the means values
in Table 1, we see a similar weakness in commitment to political rights when we look at
these claims in political contexts that include
social disruption. The four items that make up
the liberty versus order scale refer to ‘free
speech’, ‘extremist political views’, and demonstrations by ‘radical groups’. The mean scores
for this scale do not reach much above the
midpoint for Western countries and are all well
below the midpoint for the Eastern countries.
Thus, despite the high valuation of political
rights in general across all countries, this strong
commitment is decidedly weaker when these
rights are put to the test in political contests
that contain the potential for disruption.
There is also interesting variation in our
calculus of fairness measures. Procedural and
distributive justice are even more highly valued
across all countries than rights claims. Since all
three are claimant-oriented, and do not specify
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161

TABLE
2. Frequencies and row percentages for the right to a job and the rights for excluded groups items for the
six countries
Measures
Right to a job

Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Spain
France
United States

Foreigners should not be guaranteed a
job in [Country]
Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Spain
France
United States

Women should not be guaranteed a
job in [Country]
Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Spain
France
United States

Gypsieshinorities should not be
guaranteed a job in [Country]
Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Spain
United States

Rating
Not very
important
1

2

1 (0.1%)
10 (1.2%)
10 (1.3%)
2 (0.3%)
5 (0.7%)
56 (7.1%)

4 (0.5%)
15 (1.8%)
8 (1.0%)
1 (0.1%)
1 (0.1%)
37 (4.7%)

Agree
strongly
1

338 (40.8%)
319 (39%)
217 (28.1%)
20 (2.6%)
157 (20.9%)
130 (16.2%)

3

16
15
18
7

(2.0%)
(1.8%)
(2.3%)
(0.9%)
5 (0.7%)
64 (8.1%)

4

44
66
71
60
57
65

(5.4%)
(8.1%)
(9.1%)
(7.8%)
(7.5%)
(8.3%)

~

2

_

3

4

154 (18.6%)
128 (15.6%)
155 (20.1%)
152 (19.8%)
123 (16.4%)
97 (12.1%)

123 (20.3%)
137 (16.7%)
146 (18.9%)
316 (41.1%)
141 (18.8%)
224 (27.9%)

_

167 (20.2%)
174 (21.3%)
195 (25.3%)
110 (14.3%)
156 (20.8%)
277 (34.5%)

_

2

1

(3.8%)
(2.6%)
(3.2%)
(1.6%)
(2.1%)
(4.6%)

28 (3.4%)
28 (3.4%)
19 (2.4%)
25 (3.2%)
29 (3.8%)
75 (9.4%)

Agree
strongly
I

62
155
34
20
53

(7.5%)
(19%)
(4.4%)
(2.6%)
(6.6%)

751
711
673
697
693
565

(92%)
(87%)
(86.3%)
(90.9%)
(86.3%)
(71.8%)

Disagree
strongly

Agree
strongly

31
21
25
12
16
37

Very
important
5

3
29
38
30
24
34
37

(3.5%)
(4.6%)
(3.9%)
(3.1%)
(4.5%)
(4.6%)

4
74 (9.0%)
167 (20.4%)
183 (23.5%)
192 (24.9%)
148 (19.5%)
311 (38.9%)

5
123
60
58
171
174
74

(20.3%)
(7.3%)
(7.5%)
(22.2%)
(23.2%)
(9.2%)

Disagree
strongly
5

662
565
522
517
531
340

(80.3%)
(69%)
(67%)
(67.1%)
(70.1%)
(42.5%)

2

3

4

Disagree
strongly
5

58 (7%)
116 (14.2%)
26 (3.4%)
42 (5.4%)
I18 (14.8%)

108 (13.1%)
141 (17.3%)
63 (8.1%)
64 (8.3%)
55 (6.9%)

163 (19.7%)
214 (26.2%)
212 (27.3%)
290 (37.6%)
318 (39.8%)

435 (52.7%)
190 (23.3%)
441 (56.8%)
355 (46%)
254 (31.8%)

Note: Chi square analyses resulted in significant effects for the right to a job (X2(20) = 390.24, p < O.oooO1,
eta2 = 0.07) and not guaranteeing the right to a job to foreigners (X2(20)= 803.04, p < O.oooO1, eta’ = 0.12). women
(Xz(20)= 344.41, p < 0.00001, eta’ = 0.03), and gypsies (France and the United States not included in analysis)
(X2(12)=432.14,p < O.OOOO1, etaz =0.1 I).

contexts that might make them more problematic, these high valuations are not surprising.
Our comparison of the importance of procedural
and distributive justice, by a difference score
that indicates the relative importance of procedural justice, yields interesting variation, how-
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ever. Procedural justice is discounted, compared
to distributive justice, more in the new democracies than in the older democracies. It is strikingly evident that the United States values procedural far more than distributive justice.
Distributive justice carries more weight in those

162

Ellen S. Cohn and Susan 0. White

countries that have lived under a collectivist and are not unduly alarmed by its assorted
political ideology for so long, and are also fac- manifestations in their social and political
ing the economic burdens and uncertainties of worlds. Except in Spain and the United States,
market liberalization. The social fairness scale respondents also tend to be dogmatic, although
adds a different perspective to the calculus of not extremely so. These two variables provide
fairness because it is not oriented to individual support for the inference that most of these
claimants, whether for procedural or distributive countries have a moderately conservative
claims. It is interesting to note that all countries approach to social and political life.
give lower ratings to fairness that is defined in
Finally, we asked all respondents about
terms of appeals to egalitarian concepts (‘protect their perception of the state of the economy
both the strong and the weak’) and what ‘most and whether they were satisfied with ‘how
people’ want than to fairness defined in terms democracy works’ in their country. As Table 1
of individually oriented claims. Social fairness shows, all countries gave responses that were
is more highly rated among the former commu- more negative than positive. Hungary is the
nist countries than among the Western demo- exception to a roughly linear trend towards opticracies. The calculus of fairness in the United mism on the economy across our democratizStates is particularly individualistic.
ation scale. Respondents’ satisfaction with
For basic social beliefs, all countries have democracy follows the same general trend, but
mean scores towards the collectivism end of the is significantly more negative than their percepindividualism-to-collectivism continuum. While tion of the economy. Given these somewhat
it is not surprising that American respondents negative assessments of their current economic
lean more towards individualism than do the and political situations, it is not surprising that
other respondents, the fact that their support for support for politically embedded legal values
individualism does not rise above the midpoint such as rights for excluded groups, liberty and
of our scale is puzzling. This scale, which was lawfulness is lower than claims-oriented values
created for this survey, may overstate the ten- such as rights consciousness and the importance
sion between the individual and the group by of procedural justice.
Overall, there are clear country differences
characterizing individualist stances in extreme
terms. In any case, it is important to note that but these are not always related to our demostrong support for individualism is lacking in cratization scale. We now turn to other kinds
all the countries. Even though the three East of analyses to determine whether there are indiand Central European countries are distinctly cators of different socialization processes across
less individualistic than the two West European the six countries.
populations, this finding leads one to question
how necessary support for individualistic legal
values is to a democratic legal culture. Since a Socialization of subgroups
lower support for individualism is also a higher
support for collectivism, this finding is parti- The generational hypothesis
cularly intriguing when taken in conjunction
with the uniformly high support across these Since all our data have been collected at the
countries for legal values that focus on the indi- same time, we have no obvious basis for drawvidual claimant, such as rights consciousness ing inferences about changes in attitudes or
ideological stances across our several popuand procedural justice.
Another aspect of our respondents’ social lations. Finding socialization effects is somebelief systems also sheds light on their generally times a matter of specifying critical subgroups
tentative or cautious support for politically- within a population, however. Therefore, we
embedded legal values. All the countries tend have pursued a strategy of identifying subgroups
to cluster around the mid-point in the social that are potentially fertile sources of differences
conservatism scale; only Poland is above it. in socialization processes.
We start with age. The so-called ‘generSince this scale measures reaction to social
change, we can infer that the respondents have ational hypothesis’ has been discussed in the
a generally moderate response to social change social science literature for many years (Delli
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to represent the remainder of the population
even though that period had not produced a
critical event (other than the death of Franco)
of the same historical magnitude. In order to
make sense of this mass of information, we
have chosen to discuss the comparisons in terms
of the number of statistically significant differences between the cohorts, across the countries.
Table 3 below summarizes this information,
including differences over legal values, the
social beliefs that we have called sources of
legal values, and perceptions of the economy
and satisfaction with democracy.
Even though there are significant differences among the cohorts in these values and
beliefs, there is no pattern of response that particularly distinguishes one ‘generation unit’ from
the others. Most of the differences between the
age cohorts involve the youngest and the oldest
cohorts, indicating that generational effects may
be occurring. Whether these are occurring
because of normal rebellious disputes between
The possibility of really questioning and reflecting on
youths and older generations, or because of northings only emerges at the point where personal exper- mal maturation patterns, or because of generimentation with life begins - round about the age of 17,
ational imprinting during critical events, cannot
sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later. It
be determined from these data, however. It is
is only then that life’s problems begin to be located in
a ‘present’ and are experienced as such. That level of
possible that cohort effects existed at one time
data and attitudes which social change has rendered probbut
did not persist into 1995 (or, more
lematical, and which therefore requires reflection, has
importantly,
1989). It is also possible that the
now been reached; for the first time, one lives in the
‘present’. (Mannheim, 1952, p. 115)
trauma of these critical events was so extreme
as to affect the entire population deeply, regardThis emphasis on youth cohorts, while less of age or developmental stage.
explained differently from different disciplinary
We can see a pattern across the countries,
perspectives (compare Mannheim with, e.g., however. The bar graph in Figure 1 below indiJennings and Niemi, 1981, or Kohlberg, 1969) cates that there is a curvilinear relationship in
has been pervasive in the socialization literature, which the number of significant differences
especially as it deals with various forms of the among cohorts increases from Bulgaria to
generational hypothesis.
Poland to Hungary to Spain, and then decreases
Because we are interested in legal socializ- sharply with France and the United States.
ation processes within our populations, we com- There is at least a hint in this relationship of
pared generational age cohorts both within and an increasing amount of disagreement over legal
across the six countries. We identified four values as populations become more involved
youth cohorts’ in each country that meet with the issues of democratization. This kind of
Mannheim’s definition of ‘generational units’. disagreement pervades their fundamental social
Each cohort was between the ages of 13 and beliefs as well, indicating that these age groups
21 at critical event points in time: 1947 (World may be rubbing against each other increasingly
War I1 and the post-war Soviet repression), as political change grows nearer. The fact that
1956 (the Hungarian uprising), 1968 (the Spain remains high in differentiation across age
‘Prague Spring’ and student rebellions), and cohorts suggests that this youngest of the older
1989 (revolutionary upheavals in the former democracies is still at a peak of normative interSoviet satellite countries). We added a fifth cohort disagreement or activity as it learns to
youth cohort (those who were 13-21 in 1978) contend with conflictful democratic politics. In

Carpini, 1989; Jennings and Niemi, 1981;
Mannheim, 1952; Weil, 1993). There are several ways to formulate this hypothesis, but it
most frequently involves the identification of
age cohorts that are linked with major historical
events, usually at a point in the life course
labelled variously adolescence or youth. For
example, one might identify those who were in
late adolescence or early adulthood during the
Vietnam War, or World War 11, or at the time
of the Kennedy assassination. Karl Mannheim
(1952) put the generational label on this identification of critical age cohorts with the suggestion that particular experiences can mark an
entire ‘generation unit’, making it ideologically
distinct throughout its life course both from
other age cohorts and from others of the same
age who did not have these experiences. This
generational ‘defining moment’ (in the current
vernacular), Mannheim (and others) believed
coincides with a critical period in one’s youth:
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TABLE3. Number of significant differences among the youth cohorts for legal values, social beliefs, and
democratization
Measures

Legal values
Social beliefs
Democratization
Total

Countries
Hungary
Spain

Bulgaria

Poland

4
6
0
10

7

9

3
0
10

14
3
26

12
15
2
29

France

United States

9
8
2
19

5

0
3
8

Note: The significant differences are based on the results of Scheffe post hoc tests. The multivariate effects of
youth cohorts aged 13-21 years from 1947, 1956, 1968, 1978, and 1989 on legal values, social beliefs, and
democratization, were significant for each country. The legal values include lawfulness, justifiable behaviours, rights
consciousness, rights for excluded groups, liberty, procedural justice, distributive justice, relative procedural justice,
and social fairness. The social beliefs include individualism, dogmatism, and social conservatism. Democratization
includes perception of the economy and satisfaction with democracy.

latest stages of democratization. Conversely,
normative disagreement is greatest where the
battle is joined, i.e., where democratic institutions are newly established, providing public
space for democratic contests that bring out
debate and different points of view.

Elite/mass socialization
Bubaria

bland

thaary

Spain

France

USA

FIGURE I : Number of significant differences among
youth cohorts based on 13-21 year-olds in 1947, 1956,
1968, 1978 and 1989.

these terms, France is no longer in its democratic youth, and the United States is becoming
downright stodgy. In any case, these data appear
to reflect a progressive differentiation over legal
values and related beliefs in a curvilinear pattern as a population moves away from
repression towards the establishment of democratic processes and institutions. Perhaps we can
think of it as a developing normative energy
that is needed for the initiation of democracy
but that dissipates when democracy reaches
maturity.
The number of significant differences over
basic values and beliefs among the actual youth
cohorts is lowest for Bulgaria and Poland, at
one end of the democratization scale, and for
the United States at the other end. This suggests
a greater degree of consensus across generations
in those countries that are in the earliest and
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In addition to this straightforward cohort comparison, we divided the country populations into
two groups by level of education. Those with
some university training and above we designated ‘elites’ and those with no university training and below we designated ‘masses’.*
Although educational level has often been
shown to be positively correlated with liberalism - e.g., in support for democratic values and
level of tolerance (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996;
Gibson and Duch, 1993) - we would argue that
it should also be interpreted as having a broader
socializing effect. The distinction between those
with university training and those without
reflects different socializing experiences, both
in the educational process and in subsequent
occupational responsibilities. That is, those with
university training have experienced a greater
consensus about the basic questions (although
not about answers to specific issues) than those
who have not been through university. We
further argue that this division accurately
reflects respondents’ eventual political and
economic locations within their society and,
therefore, their actual power differential as well.
In short, there is likely to be greater commonal-
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n
u
/.eleal
0msses
Lld

1

Bulgaria

Wnd

hmary

Spain

Francs

LEA

I

FIGURE2 : Number of significant differences for elites”
and massesh based on youth cohorts from 1947, 1956,
1968, 1978 and 1989.
Elites have at least some university education.

elites in the Western countries. This finding
suggests that the progressive differentiation over
time in these new democracies was taking place
among the less educated masses, and that the
best educated in these populations (and also,
most likely, those in elite roles) held relatively
uniform values throughout the long years of
Soviet domination and even to 1995. It is also
possible, of course, that the uniformity of elites
in the new democracies developed after 1989,
since all we know from these data is from 1995.

Conclusion

Masses have either no education or education below univemity level.

ity of experience among those in social
locations filled with people who have had university training than across all levels of education.
The number of significant differences
among youth cohorts within the masses and
among youth cohorts within the elites is
presented in Figure 2 above. Figure 2 provides
two additional pieces of information about the
socializing process. First, there are more significant normative differences among age
cohorts who are non-elites than among elite
age cohorts in all countries except France. And
second, there are more significant normative differences among the elite age cohorts in the
West than among elite age cohorts in the East.
The fact that non-elites are more likely to disagree with each other about values and social
beliefs than elites is probably to be expected,
we would argue, given the relative commonality
produced over time through higher education.
Experiences during university training as well
as the relatively restricted cultural focus of that
kind of intellectual milieu are likely to circumscribe attitudes towards a broad consensus about
basic questions, even though these elites might
disagree about specific issues. University training is also likely to track recipients towards
elite roles in their society so that later experiences tend to reinforce cultural consensus within
this subgroup. It is particularly interesting that
elites in the three former Soviet satellites manifest almost no normative disagreement among
age cohorts, in contrast to both elites and non-
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The rule of law ideal in the West has meant at
least the following: the primacy of law over
arbitrary uses of political power, the primacy
of the individual through the protection of individual rights claims, and the primacy of universalism over particularism through the abstraction of the individual ‘before the law’ from
social characteristics. This liberal legal ideology
undoubtedly faces modification when it is carried like a banner beyond the streets and marketplaces of revolution into the institutions of
new democracies. As a banner, it does not
describe accurately the actual legal practices of
even its originators in Anglo-American law, let
alone those of the many nations that would
claim to have modelled their constitutions on
it. But it is often assumed that the populations
of countries that claim the label ‘liberal democracy’ support these principles of the rule of
law ideal, and that populations in transitional
societies must come to support these principles
if they are ever to succeed in establishing and
maintaining stable liberal democracies. That is
why a comparison of legal cultures across new
and older democracies is important: to test our
assumptions about the role of legal values in the
normative attitudinal structures of populations
across this spectrum.
What is the normative status of public
values such as liberty, justice and equality, and
of public acts such as asserting rights and being
held accountable under the law? How alike or
different are valuations by the populations
across the spectrum of democratization? The
older democracies are generally more liberal
than the new democracies, both in their level
of support for legal values and in the social
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beliefs that underlie them. We would argue that
this is a socialization effect reflecting differences in (1) the relationship between the individual and governmental authority that reaches
well back towards the beginning of this century
in the cases of Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary,
including several forms of authoritarian rule
(Held, 1992). It also reflects (2) the experiences
of democracy in Spain, France and the United
States, experiences which tend to take the sharpest edge off fears of democratic muddle, conflict
and disorder. And (3), in the differentiation
analysis the curvilinear relationship across the
scale of democratization clearly shows striking
increases in the number of significant differences among age cohorts in the two countries
closest to democratization in 1995, Hungary on
the pre-democracy side and Spain just newly
on the democracy side. Although generational
replacement is an obvious factor, we would
argue that experiences with or close to democracy contribute to the liberalizing effect.
With respect to the characteristics of the
rule of law ideal that the legal values represent,
there are different kinds of effects for law consciousness, rights consciousness, and justice
judgments. Law consciousness centres on extent
of adherence to law under different circumstances. Here the moral authority of law is at
stake because one’s willingness to depart from
strict adherence depends in part on one’s felt
obligation to obey. When the moral authority
of law is specifically invoked, respondents in
all countries indicate an increased commitment
to lawfulness. Law’s moral force does not
appear to have distinctly different effects across
these populations, however. The variation that is
documented by the justifiable behaviours scale
appears tied to the social meaning of particular
kinds of acts rather than to liberalization. It
underscores the value of thinking about the
moral authority of law in both abstract and
specific terms. In our view, much more needs
to be done in this area because law consciousness is an important nut that has yet to be
cracked.
The analysis of rights consciousness
uncovered multiple facets of the rule of law
ideal in the context of democratization. Populations in the East were somewhat lower than
those in the West in their valuation of rights
claims but all populations valued rights very
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highly. That is, while there is a higher rights
consciousness under the older democracies, the
newer democracies are not far behind in valuing
the entitlement of individual claimants. And the
claims are to a broad range of benefits (see
appendix), perhaps reflecting a notion that
democratization brings all good things to all
people. We also found differentiation between
rights stated without specification of the claimant (‘right to a job’) and rights specifying claimants by their social characteristics (women, foreigners, gypsies, minorities). Women fared well
across the six countries, gypsies and minorities
would be treated variously depending on the
country, and foreigners did distinctly less well
everywhere. On the other hand, when we looked
at specification of political rights in the context
of liberty versus order, it became clear that the
new democracies (Bulgaria, Poland, and
Hungary) would countenance significantly less
entitlement to political rights than the older
democracies. Again, the general enthusiasm for
rights consciousness is important, but that finding must be tempered with evidence of
exclusionary politics across the board and the
relative willingness to sacrifice political rights
in the new democracies.
While this pattern is not surprising, it does
point up the importance of commitment to the
rule of law in the process of democratization.
The ethic of legality implies that the law can
act as a guiding principle according to which
contests between rights and duties may be
resolved. Legality requires reciprocities between
rights claims and duties that meet the standards
of public values such as fairness, liberty and
equality. These values often pose contradictions,
or at least inconsistencies, in the situations of
conflict in ordinary life from which legal issues
and claims arise. In liberal legal ideology, the
law’s guiding principle is based on the abstraction of the individual from social characteristics.
The decidedly illiberal valuation of rights to a
job for foreigners, and to a somewhat lesser
extent for gypsies/minorities, is disturbing. But
it is perhaps less disturbing in the United States,
where the established institutions are likely to
override these biases, than in the new democracies, which are without well-established legal
institutions that might adhere more to the guiding principle of the law than to partisan or
prejudicial fears in the populace.

Legal socialization effects on democratization

The area of justice judgments provides a
mixed but interesting picture. Our proposed
calculus of fairness, composed of the relative
importance of procedural and distributive justice balanced by the weight given to communitarian concerns, clearly indicates that the new
democracies are more likely to be influenced
by distributive outcomes and communitarian
principles than the older democracies. The
implications of this finding are several, but
most important for the purposes of this article
is the shift away from placing the individual
in the centre of the rule of law ideal. The
social fairness differences, while not large, are
statistically significant. The relative importance of procedural justice decreases significantly for the East, indicating a completely
different direction from that consistently found
in the procedural justice literature from the
United States (Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994;
Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988). Our findings raise intriguing questions about the role
of this kind of calculation of fairness in democratization cross-culturally, especially across
the many cultures in which the individual is
subordinated to the group in most areas of
life. While we have not raised the issue of
market liberalization here, it is important to
keep in mind that the central role of the individual creates a critical coincidence between
the law of liberal democracy and the law of
market capitalism. Cross-cultural research on
conceptions of responsibility (Hamilton and
Sanders, 1992) is opening new avenues for
exploration in this area that it will be
important to pursue. In the meantime, it should
be noted that procedural justice - clearly a
value oriented to the individual claimant - was
the most highly rated of all the legal values
across all the countries.
Our cohort analysis also opened new questions. The adolescentlgenerational hypothesis is
often assumed to be true without empirical evidence. We found it difficult to identify clearcut distinctiveness in any generational unit.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we
could not make causal inferences or disentangle
possible alternative explanations for the effects
we did find. In general, we were not able to
confirm the adolescent/generational hypothesis
using these data. The significant difference
analysis provided an unusual methodological
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tool with which to identify cohort diversity,
however, because it allowed us to describe
progressive differentiation in these populations.
We noted a curvilinear relationship across the
democratization scale that indicated distinctly
different amounts of cohort disagreement on
basic values and social beliefs depending on
where the particular country was located in the
democratization process: the newest and oldest
democracies had the least amount of cohort differentiation; the peaking democracies, Hungary
and Spain, showed the greatest amount of differentiation (Figure 1). We also found that elites
were less likely to show cohort differentiation
than masses (Figure 2), and elites in the new
democracies were almost without differentiation
in their basic beliefs and values. We can only
speculate that these elites, in countries just
released from domination by repressive regimes,
had been forced into relative uniformity over
time.
In testing assumptions about the role of
legal values in the normative attitudinal structures of populations that approximate to a continuum of democratization, we have raised some
new questions about socialization processes and
the liberal legal model. Now, six years after the
1989 revolutions, public values are still newly
open for normative definition and affirmation in
the new democracies. The survey results
reported here reveal a populace which is generally conservative to moderate in its basic social
beliefs, cautious about democracy but with a
sense of greater individual entitlement to come.
The role of the law as protector and facilitator
of individual entitlement is the great promise
of the liberal legal model. As democratization
proceeds, with its increasing differentiation
across groups by age and education, and the
conflictful politics that democracy inevitably
spawns, these populations will experience both
incitement and excitement. Just as the Western
world watched with awe the revolutionary
events of 1989, we await the coming political
struggles in the hope that legal liberalism can
play a strong and positive role. We are
observers of this process in two senses: both as
supportive bystanders and as scholars. In terms
of the latter, we hope that this article is only
the first step towards a more rigorous understanding of the interaction between law and
culture in democratization.
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Appendix: Measurement of
the scales

the right to a clean and safe environment
the right to abortion

Summated scales were constructed for each of
the following sets of items.

Rights for excluded groups
While the guarantee to a job may be important
in general

Legal values

foreigners should not be guaranteed a job in
[country]
women should not be guaranteed a job in [country]
gypsies/minorities (US) should not be guaranteed a job in [country]

Lawfulness
It’s alright to get round the law as long as you
don’t actually break it. (Disagree)
The government should have some ability to
bend the law in order to solve pressing social
and political problems. (Disagree)
It is not necessary to obey a law you consider
unjust. (Disagree)
Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law
and solve problems immediately rather than
wait for a legal solution. (Disagree)
If you don’t agree with a law, it is alright to
break it. (Disagree)
Justifiable behaviours
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in
between.
Claiming state benefits that one is not entitled
to. (Never be justified)
Not paying all one’s taxes. (Never be justified)
Buying something a person knows was stolen
(Never be justified)
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of
their duties. (Never be justified)
Using the company’s equipment or supplies for
work outside the company. (Never be justified)
Rights consciousness
Next I will read through a list of rights and
freedoms. Please tell me how important these
rights are to you personally.
freedom to express your important political
views
freedom of religion
freedom to join and participate in social and
political groups and unions
equality in front of (before) the law
the right to a job
the right to own land and private property
the right of foreigners to settle in [country]
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Social beliefs
Individualism
It is more important to do the kind of work
society needs than to do the kind of work I
like. (Disagree)
The most important thing to teach children is
obedience to their parents. (Disagree)
People should go along with whatever is best
for the group, even when they disagree.
(Disagree)
We as [nationality] have a responsibility to
ensure that all our countrymen have the chance
to a decent life. (Disagree)
If people are going to live in [nationality]
society, they ought to be forced to accept
[nationality] ways and customs (Disagree)
Dogmatism
There are two kinds of people in the world:
those who are for the truth and those who are
against it.
A group which tolerates too many differences
of opinion among its own members cannot exist
for long.
To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the
betrayal of our own side.
Of all the different philosophies which exist in
the world, there is probably only one which
is correct.
Social conservatism
People should try to adapt to the rules of society
rather than fighting them.
It is best to accept the flaws of existing authority because it is dangerous to try to change it.
People should not try to change how society
works but just accept the way it is.
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Democratization
Perception of the economy
How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last
twelve months? Would you say it has got . . .
(a lot better)
How do you think the general economic situation in this country will change in the next
twelve months? Would you say it will . . .
(considerably improve)?
How would you say that you and your family
are . . . (living much better)?
And what about the next twelve months? Would
you say you and your family will . . . (live
much better)?
And how much does it worry you that during
the next twelve months you or some member
of your family will be unemployed? (not at
all worried)
Satisfaction with democracy
On the whole, to what extent are you satisfied
with the way democracy works in [country]?
Liberty
It is better to live in an orderly society than to
allow people so much freedom that they can
become disruptive. (Disagree)
Free speech is just not worth it if it means we
have to put up with the danger to society of
extremist political views. (Disagree)
Society shouldn’t have to put up with political
views that are fundamentally different from the
views of the majority. (Disagree)
Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist

political groups shouldn’t be allowed to demonstrate. (Disagree)
Procedural justice
Imagine you had an encounter with someone in
a government office. When you think about
such an encounter, how important to you are
the following factors:
to have the person at the office listen to my
story
to have the person at the office explain
hisher decision
to have the person treat me with respect
to have the person treat me the same as he/she
treats other people.
Distributive justice
Imagine you had an encounter with someone in
a government office. When you think about
such an encounter, how important to you is the
following factor:
to get what I want
Relative procedural justice
Mean procedural justice minus distributive justice
Social fairness
A fair law is one that has everyone’s agreement.
It makes sense to follow laws because most
people do.
A fair law is one that protects both the strong
and the weak.
A law is fair when most people like it.

Notes

* As is the case with all our joint
publications, this article represents
a genuine research collaboration
between the authors, with equal
contributions. Therefore, neither is
first or second author. This article
uses data from a collaborative
project that grew out of the Law
and Society Association’s ’Working
Group on Orientations toward Law
and Normative Ordering’. Ellen S.
Cohn, lames L. Gibson, Susan 0.
White, Joseph Sanders, Joan
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McCord, and Felice Levine were
responsible for the development and
implementation of the research
design. Funding for the project was
provided by the (US) National
Science Foundation (SE 13237 and
SIR 11403). Our European
collaborators include Chantal
Kourilsky-Augeven (France),
Grazyna Skapska, Iwona
Jakubowska-Branicka, and Maria
Barucka-Arctowa (Poland), Andras
Sajo (Hungary), Rosemary Barberet

(Spain), and Stefka Naoumova
(Bulgaria). Pam Moore, Kris
Guffey, Marika Litras, Julie
Nadeau, John Kraft, and Kimberly
Smirles provided valuable research
assistance.
1. We determined the number of
significant differences by first
conducting multivariate analysis of
variance tests with the five youth
cohorts (1947, 1956, 1968, 1978,
1989) as the levels of the
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independent variable and the legal
values, social beliefs, and the
democratization variables for each
of the six countries (Bulgaria,
Poland, Hungary, Spain, France,
and the United States). To divide
the participants into the five youth
cohorts, we took respondents who
were 13-21 years old in 1947 (born
in 192&1934), 1956 (born in
1931-1943), 1968 (born in 19471955), 1978 (born in 1957-1965),
and 1989 (born in 1968-1976). The
youth cohort effect was significant

Ellen S. Cohn and Susan 0. White
at the multivariate level for each of
the three sets of variables in all six
countries. Then Scheffe post hoc
tests were conducted on the
individual variables which were
significant at the univariate level.
We then added the total number of
significant differences for all three
categories of the variables.
2. We defined elites and masses by
years of education. Elites were
those respondents who reported at
least some university education and

masses were those who reported
either no education or less than
university education. The only
exception was in the United States
where elites were those who had
completed a university education or
more (in order to keep the elites at
less than 50% of the sample). The
percentages of elites were 12.1% in
Bulgaria, 10.8% in Poland, 12.6%
in Hungary, 18.5% in Spain, 23.64
in France and 36.7% in the United
States.
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